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Debating the state of democracy and the alleged contribution mass communication makes to either
upholding or degrading republican virtues has been one of the standard endeavours of mass
communication studies. The locus classicus is  Walter  Lippmann’s Public Opinion (1922),
accompanied byThe Phantom Public (1925), and the response they elicited from John Dewey
(1954). A less known, even if equally heuristic case is the early Jürgen Habermas’s (1962)
diagnosis  of  the  possibilities  of  socialist  democracy  in  the  post-war  Federal  Republic,  and  the
scathing criticism it provoked in Niklas Luhmann (1970).1 The parallel expansion of neo-
liberalism and the demise of the Soviet Union, backed up by the emergence of internet, gave in
many quarters rise to a renewed interest in the relation between the public sphere, civil society and
the polity in Western liberal democracies. One of the most persistant representatives of this phase
in English-language media research has been Peter Dahlgren.2 During the 1990s and 2000s he has
defended a civic-culture approach to tackling the problem of ‘democratic deficit’ and the media’s
potentials in making it up. In the following, I will assess Dahlgren’s contribution in four steps:
staging the problem; presenting Dahlgren’s major premises and theoretical ideas; illustrating
Dahlgren’s theoretical position by contrasting it to some counter-cases; and suggesting another
solution to the methodological goal underlying Dahlgren’s project.
1 I have dwelt in some detail on these preludes to the contemporary debates in Malmberg (2009).
2 By stressing the geopolitics of language, I want to draw attention to Dahlgren’s self-imposed limitation of
‘Englishness’, not uncommon in an age when university administrations urge scholars to “publish in English or perish”,
a policy adhered to vigorously by small countries like the Nordic ones (for details, see Ingwersen 2000; for the rationale
at large, see Wæver 1998). In practice this is manifested in the fact that Dahlgren bypasses not only the rich and
theoretically sophisticated German-language research on the public sphere, which he may not be aware of, but also
pioneering Danish contributions of enduring quality overshadowed by the ‘Anglo-Saxon turn’ (see Mortensen & Møller
1976; Sørensen 1975). This conforms with the procedures adopted by major English-language publishers in the field,
namely, that references to non-English sources be curtailed, if not completely dispensed with (cf. Alasuutari 2004, 595–
599)
2The Diagnosis of the Present, Crisis of Democacy and the State of Mass Media
During the 20th century, Western democracies with representative governments elected on the
basis of more or less universal suffrage were assaulted from various directions during three major
periods: between the world wars, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, and in the 1990s. The first
period witnessed the triumph of authoritarian regimes all over Continental Europe, the most fatally
in Germany; the second led to the brink of civil war in France and, especially, Italy; and the third
gave rise to a paradox: with the collapse of the European socialist bloc, the victory of democracy
was paralleled with an alleged decay of democratic spirit. In consequence, the stability of
democratic rule, a problem known to Aristotle and debated ever since in political philosophy, has
been one of the crucial issues occupying periodically the minds of political scientists, including
those media scholars concerned with the political implications of mass communication. The
question is how the new circumstances of the turn of the 21st century have changed our problem
situation. In order to provide a background for analysing Dahlgren’s position, I will take up three
themes in general diagnoses of the present (e.g.,  Hobsbawm 1994; Hirsch 2002; Ruby 1990) and
consider their potential impact on mass media: the return of economic inequality, the crisis of
representation in politics, and the increasing untransparency of cultural discourses.
The postwar economic boom – the “Thirty Glorious Years”, as the French call them –
was  cut  off  in  the  1970s,  sparking  off  what  has  been  termed  as  post-Fordism,  neo-liberalism  or
network capitalism. One of the major consequences of the new economic regime was a growing
disparity between social classes or strata, in two complementary ways. First, as the new mode of
production was leaning on highly qualified workforce in knowledge-based industries, those with
less abilities were marginalised. What is more, economic reproduction now longer had any need
for  the  output  of  the  whole  adult  population,  with  poverty  –  or  ‘surplus  population’  outside  of
productive labour – returning as a social issue (Bauman 1987). Second, as higher education
expanded considerably, the upper middle classes began to constitute a considerable segment,
meaning that what once was a small cultural elite now consisted of a third of the population (Todd
2008). In this way the new economic realities of inequality gave rise to widening fractures and
polarisation in the society.
It was the express function of the postwar welfare state to provide consensus by trying
to keep economic inequality to a minimum. However, under the new economic regime, welfare
3states, in an attempt to secure their finances, were transformed into competitive states. In
liberalised capitalism, with the market as the driving force of the political society, states began to
see themselves as business-like enterprises which had to wage economic war against those states
being able to produce more cheaply. As a result, the core of politics consisted less of ruling by
lawmaking and more of ruling by negotiating between different interests. This diminished the
power of legislatures and increased that of the executive branch (administration) as well as of
different advocacy groups (businesses, lobbies, those using media for manipulative purposes).3 In
other words, democratic government was weakened to the advantage of less popular and more
oligarchic rule.
The parallel change on the cultural plane, having its manifestation in postmodernist
discourse, contributed to the sense of disorientation and malaise felt in the body politic. The
philosophy of liberal democracy was an offspring of Enlightenment with its cultural foundations
in a humanistic vision of man’s cognitive, moral and aesthetic development. This is why language,
media  and  communication  –  as  a  means  of  disclosing  the  world,  of  learning  to  sympathise  with
others, and of giving expression to one’s self – were accorded a special place in cultural politics.
In the conditions of late 20th century, with its neo-television and new computer media, there
seemed to be, however, much more reason to resort to Counter-Enlightenment, elements of which
postmodernists provided for the intellectual scene in general and media studies in particular. As a
consequence, the idea of a well-informed citizenry, the corner-stone of popular sovereignty
legitimising democratic pratice, lost much, if not most of its content. If media, verbal and other,
are, because of intrinsic deficiencies, incapable of describing more or less adequately what is
happening in nature and society, there is no need for autonomous cognitive institutions such as
science or journalism. Whats is needed are affective machines bypassing rational judgment and
opening up spaces of feeling-based participation.4
In explaining the sense of ‘democratic melancholy’ (Bruckner 1990) prevailing over
the 1990s and 2000s, one can point out economic, political and cultural factors, or any
combination of them – in conjunction with social, technological, ecological and other possible
determinants. In media and mass communication studies, the decisive question, however, concerns
the role of mass media in eroding the working of democratic government and reducing citizens’
3 As to the United States, Morton Keller (2007) makes the convincing case that this change of political regimes took
place already with Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. Adopting this line of interpretation would grant more
coherence to 20th century politics, political communication included, than is the case in those versions of the ‘structural
transformation of the public sphere’ thesis stressing the epochal meaning of the turn of the 21st century. As a
comprehensive survey of the relations between democracy and media in the 20th century, combining perspectives on
both longue durée and new directions, see Bertho Lavenir (2000).
4readiness to support it even in hard times. One of the most pessimistic pictures has been drawn by
Douglas Kellner (1990; 2005) in an alarmist manner.
According to Kellner, the turn-of-the-21st-century crisis of US democracy has been
caused by a shift in the balance of power between major politically relevant institutions, making
fair and free elections practically impossible. The mainstream media are responsible for this in
two complementary ways. First, as a consequence of a ever tighter economic and political control,
made possible by the deregulation policies of the 1980s, they have been transformed into blatant
tools to advance corporate interests, both economic and political. This has assisted in producing a
conservative hegemony, which has biased the media agenda. Second, the parallel rise to
prominense of the new media culture of spectacle, centred around television and leaning on the
fabrication of pseudo-events as well as publicity stunts, has further eroded the possibility of the
mainstream media to serve the public interest. As a result, with the elections of 2000 and its
aftermath, the United States faced the greatest crisis in the history of the Republic.
   Dahlgren’s Project: Second-Wave Cultural Studies Meets Habermasian Critical Theory
Dahlgren’s contribution to debating the place of media in the crisis of democracy, spelled out in a
stream of articles mostly between Television and the Public Sphere (1995) and Media and
Political Engagement (2009)5,  combines  Cultural  Studies  with  aspects  of  Habermas’s  version  of
Critical Theory. In order to make an interpretation of Dahlgren’s output on the subject, I will first
characterise his mix of Cultural Studies and Habermasian Critical Theory, then present briefly his
ideas on late modernity as the foundation of our contemporary practical and theoretical horizon,
and describe finally in some detail major elements of his argumentation.
Dahlgren shares with Critical Theory the basic premise that social and cultural theory
should gives us “normative guides to the good society” (Dahlgren 2004, 13). This is what
Habermas early on described as the objective of combining the classical tradition of political
philosophy with modern political science, including political sociology of the public sphere – the
theoretical programme he has, with varied conceptual means, tried to pursue since the turn of the
1960s. In line with Habermas and in contrast to empiricist political (media) studies, Dahlgren
4 In Malmberg (1996), I have briefly analysed the 20th century development of film and television from a similar point
of view, diagnosing the present audiovisual media society as a society of spectacle, interaction and entertainment.
5 The latter book mainly rehashes articles published earlier, with additions of minor importance as far as the main line
of Dahlgren’s argumentation is concerned; so I shall use the first formulations as my principal corpus. It is to be noted
that Dahlgren recycles repeatedly the same ideas, transferring not infrequently whole passages verbatim from one
article to another, than is necessitated by purely argumentative reasons. One might, critically, consider this as an
5sticks to the normative import of concepts like ‘democracy and ‘public sphere’, stating, for
example, that the public sphere has become “a focal point for our desire for the good society”
(Dahlgren 1991, 1–2). Despite the common ethical ground, Dahlgren’s position diverges,
however, from Habermasian Critical Theory as he sees in at least three significant respects, which
brings him within range of Cultural Studies (as an overall presentation of Cultural Studies by
himself, see Dahlgren 1997).
First, Dahlgren repeatedly admonishes Habermas for neglecting the cultural side of
the public sphere. This makes, on Dahlgren’s reading, Habermas incapable both of understanding
the function of media culture, with popular culture as its centre, as the most important
interpretative framework or symbolic environment of the citizens, and of explaining why people
bother  at  all  to  engage  politically,  given  the  adverse  conditions  of  the  ‘end  of  politics’.  What  is
called for, hence, is a ‘cultural turn’ the tools of which are provided in the first hand by Cultural
Studies.  It  is  Cultural  Studies  that  can  fill  both  of  the  gaps  in  Habermas:  it  is  at  the  level  of  a
‘mediatised’ social world built around a popular-cultural imaginary, and it can account for the
political  use  of  media  in  more  concrete  ways.  This  brings  us  to  Dahlgren’s  second  shift  of
emphasis. Underlying Dahlgren’s theoretical idea is a strict separation between the analytical
levels of social structure and social action, with the stress on the latter in the form of life-world or
everyday life. This has to do with Dahlgren’s relationship with the traditions of Cultural Studies.
Instead of the structural-sociological Cultural Studies of Stuart Hall and others, Dahlgren is
mainly leaning on the ethnographic and popular-culturalist research on media reception. As a
result, when dealing with politics and media, he has, unlike Hall (e.g., 1980), little to say about the
functioning of the state in the implementation of democracy. Dahlgren’s antistatism is a
methodological consequence of his privileging, alongside with post-1970s Cultural Studies, the
experiential dimension of social subjects and communicative practices. In itself, this is not an
inevitable step one has to take, as witnessed by the later Habermas’s dual theory of system and
life-world (Habermas 1981) and his corresponding conception of the public sphere (Habermas
2008a). It is correlated more with Dahlgren’s theory of knowledge, which is my third point.
Notwithstanding his adoption of the axiological discourse, Dahlgren accords neither theoretical
research in general nor normative research in particular any central place in his methodology. This
manifests itself in his exclusive underscoring of empirical research, whether in dealing with
everyday communication between citizens (e.g., Dahlgren 2002, 16–19) or with the political use
the young and adults alike have found for the internet (e.g., Dahlgren 2003, 162–168; Dahlgren &
offspring of the same drive to maximise legitimate visibility as the intention to address the English-speaking scholarly
audience only referred to in note 2.
6Olsson  2007).  It  is  one  thing  to  make  a  distinction  between  theoretical  and  empirical  research,
both of which are of utmost relevance for Habermas’s methodology, and another to substitute one
for the other. In trying to escape from theoretical impasses of pre-1980s Cultural Studies,
Dahlgren has, with the cultural turn, adopted an ‘empirical turn’, too.
There have been major both intellectual and social reasons for critical media scholars
to turn their backs on earlier models such as the Frankfurt School. As a matter of fact, post-1970
Cultural Studies has been animated by a seething animosity against Critical Theory, especially its
theory of culture industry. Because of his political intuitions, and because of the unsurpassable
case of Habermas, Dahlgren has distanced himself from the mainstream of this kind of reasoning,
trying to bridge the gap between political media research of the Habermasian type and politically
informed studies of popular culture in Cultural Studies. As far as I can see, the change of
perspectives has become necessary for Dahlgren in view of the major social upheavals of the late
20th century, to which post-structuralist or post-modernist theorising has more or less successfully
responded. In order to provide a background for Dahlgren’s more specific solutions to problems
dealing with contemporary political media studies, I will briefly take up for our purpose the most
relevant aspects of his diagnosis of the present.
Dahlgren is quite outspoken about the political difficulties facing the contemporary
world. His work abounds in expressions like “we find ourselves in another kind of dark historical
time [comparable to that the first generation of the Frankfurt School encountered]” (Dahlgren
1998, 99), “democracy has entered a troubled era” (Dahlgren 2004, 17) or “what we are faced with
is a serious erosion of civic engagement” (Dahlgren 2005a, 323). Unlike biopoliticians like
Giorgio Agamben (2001) under Foucault’s and Deleuze’s influence, Dahlgren does not, however,
suggest that the “new historical juncture” (Dahlgren 2003, 164; Dahlgren & Gurevitch 2005, 384)
which  democracy  has  entered  is  based  on  a  permanent  state  of  emergency.  As  a  dialectician  of
sorts, he rather seeks for a mediation between a purely negative and a purely positive evaluation of
our chances to navigate successfully across the rough sea. Sociological sobriety (cf., e.g.,
Dahlgren 1996, 61) compels Dahlgren to go beyond both pessimism and optimism, and this
existential undercurrent, backed up by a heavy dose of post-structuralist philosophising, informs
his diagnosis of the present as late modernity. Our immediate interest here is to see how this
diagnosis leads to issues concerned with mass media, public sphere and civic culture.
Late modernity, in Dahlgren’s interpretation, is the phase in the evolution of the
modern society when certainties of different kinds disintegrate. ‘Contingency’ is the code word for
this state of affairs: there are now longer universal characteristics or general laws, just contextual
combinations of features or events bound in time and place. That is, things no longer are what they
7used to be in the hemisphere of high modernity with its analytically safe distinctions between self
and  non-self,  reason  and  affect,  or  public  and  private.  This  reflexivity,  or  blurring  of  the
boundaries, is Dahlgren’s explanation for the alleged crisis of parliamentarism or representative
government. Namely, as people’s personal identities lose their fixity, the dividing line between
public and private spheres becomes porous. As a result, private matters assume political
significance, which generates identity politics based not on striving for the public interest as
represented by the formal political bodies, but on giving expression to specific sociocultural
communities and life-styles, for which the internet seems to be an ideal medium of
communication. Extra-parliamentary movements did not, of course, first emerge in the 1980s and
1990s, but it is the instability of the liberal democracy of the turn of the 21st century which seems
to make them of special importance for Dahlgren’s argument. Another reason is provided by the
new media landscape.
For Dahlgren, like Habermas, mass communication is one of the core constituents of
modernity (see Dahlgren 1995, 7–8). Without it there would be neither democratic politics nor
democratic culture. But also this Enlightenment presupposition becomes, under the conditions of
late modern reflexivity, problematic. The new media age, brought forth first by the neo-television
in the 1980s and then by the internet in the 1990s, undermines some of the key assumptions of
Enlightenment, which Habermas (1962) analysed with the concept of the bourgeois public sphere.
In fact, Dahlgren’s exposition recapitulates pretty much of the crisis of the late bourgeois society
(Habermas 1961, 50) or late capitalism (Habermas 1973) as diagnosed by Habermas during his
Marxist  phase.  The core idea boils down to the suggestion that,  when there no longer exists any
firm distinction between the public and the private, the public sphere in general as well as political
engagement in particular lose their achoring in the extra-political sphere. As previously non-
political matters assume political character, the reconstitution of the liberal public sphere or a new
basis of democratic will-formation is called for. The one significant difference between young
Habermas and Dahlgren resides in where they locate the centre of this late modern extra-
parliamentary politics. In the early 1960s, Habermas  (1962, 243–255) put his faith in extending
democracy with help of the publics that were formed inside organisations in their relation to the
state; these might, Habermas hoped, operate as the new substitute for the publics the rising
bourgeoisie had given rise to with cafés and reading clubs, an option he was soon to drop maybe
because Luhmann (1970, 3– 6) considered it as a definite dead end.6 Dahlgren’s theoretical choice
6 Organisational democracy, Mitbestimmung, was one of the prominent ideas of the West German student movement;
one might see the philosophy of some of its leaders, like Rudi Dutschke, as materialisation of early Habermas’s idea of
the reconstituted public sphere.
8brings me to a closer look at his communication, media and democratic theories. I will explicate
them in three steps, as three different specifications of the connection between democracy and
(mass) communication.
(1) The major conceptual innovation that Dahlgren proposes for the study of political
communication is the notion of civic culture. The concept plays no significant role in Television
and the Public Sphere (1995), where ‘civil culture’ assumes its role in the theoretical framework,
but it is introduced with vigour some five years later (Dahlgren 2000a, 2000b). It is with the
concept of civic culture that Dahlgren tries to address theorerically the crisis of democracy by
searching for the roots which make popular sovereignty possible. In a sense, Dahlgren equates
democracy with civic culture, for it is civic culture which makes the democratic system possible
(Dahlgren  2000a,  335);  and  in  a  similar  vein  he  is  ready  to  argue  that  without  a  healthy  civic
culture  “democracy  as  a  system  has  no  future”  (Dahlgren  2001a,  75).  One  might  see  this  as  a
‘Kantian’ solution: Dahlgren asks for the possibility of existence of democracy, and his answer is
civic culture. The question is how this connection is made credible.
Dahlgren (e.g., 2000) defines civic culture as the normative and cultural resources of
citizenship, political engagement included. In line with the ethnographic version of Cultural
Studies,  civic  culture  is  then  specified  as  a  focus  on  civic  agency  or  citizenship  seen  from  the
perspective of everyday life and action. Democracy is possible when and only when people see
themselves as citizens in informal political contexts, which implies a democratic ethos anchored in
daily routines and the ability to act in special ways on this basis. The reasons for acting are related
to  the  self-image  or  identity  people  have  of  themselves.  This  gives  rise,  as  mentioned,  to  the
various kinds of identity – or life-style – politics the contemporary extra-parliamentary political
scene is composed of. This is so because, as the personal or private has become political, there is a
proliferation of possible political issues dispersed across the social body.7 Dahlgren summarises
the several aspects of his concept of civic culture with a catalogue that originally has four
(Dahlgren 2000a) but is then enlarged to include to six aspects or variables (Dahlgren 2007). The
final version encompasses as the dimensions of civic culture: knowledge; values; trust and
affinity; spaces; paractices and skills; and identities. Of these, identities are the most important,
while the others are “contributing reciprocally to shaping the conditions of its existence”
(Dahlgren 2007, 63).
7 To support this philosophically, Dahlgren (2002; 2007) leans on Chantal Mouffe’s distinction between the political
and politics, the former being ontologically more deap-seated in contrast to the latter which marks the field of formal
politics. I will return to Mouffe and her Left Schmittian problematics later.
9Communication, mass and interpersonal, is relevant for civic culture in all its
dimensions, even if its relevance depends on the kind of media used and type of communication
activated. Dahlgren has devoted special attention to two media, television and the internet, in
assessing their potential as means of fostering civic culture.  At the systemic level one can say that
civic culture would not be possible without late modern media, because the latter as a whole
constitute people’s general symbolic environment. In a post-traditional or reflexive late modern
society, by definition, the cultural resources of action are no longer provided by family, church or
even voluntary associations, but by the ubiquitous media of communication. As a result, for
Dahlgren, people tend to construct their identities on the basis of the material they get from the
meanings circulated by media. What is more, politics as we know it would be deprived of its main
avenue had it  not at  its  disposal the public spaces provided by media.  It  is  in this way that civic
culture,  as  the  source  of  political  identity  and  as  civic  engagement,  is  linked  up  with
communicative practices.
(2)  To  speak  of  communication  or  media  as  relevant  for  democracy,  without  at  the
same time making clear what kind of communication and which aspects of the media one has in
mind, does not lead very far. The young Habermas sorted out two kinds of media (the novel and
the newspaper) and two kinds of communicative practices (reading in the general sense and
speaking) that the rising bourgeoisie resorted to in its emancipatory project.8 Later on Habermas
has devoted only minimal attention to the cultural public sphere of literature, arts and religion, and
this has resulted in the exclusive focus on the communicative paradigm of speaking to each other,
that is, on discussion or conversation. Dahlgren adopts the later Habermas’s intuition, which has
been articulated as the theory of deliberative democracy (Habermas 1996; 2003), and turns it into
a theory of radical democracy cast as civic republicanism (Dahlgren 2006; 2007).
Communicatively this implies the idea that “democracy resides, ultimately, with citizens who
engage  in  talk  with  each  other”  (Dahlgren  2005b,  149).  Then,  if  civic  culture  is  the  basis  of
democracy, talk is the basis of civic culture, especially in its strong form of discussions around
which publics are formed. Or, people become democrats and sustain their loyalty to the
democratic polity by engaging in certain kinds of speech acts.
Dahlgren’s conception of civic republicanism, like the deliberative democracy of later
Habermas, is predicated on the relations between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forms of
politics. Even if Dahlgren may be characterised as an antistatist in that he has no substantial or
8 Too hasty encounters with Habermas’s Strukturwandel (1962), Dahlgren’s included, have significantly missed the
cultural emphasis of the book. The reception of Habermas in media research was more complicated and nuanced in the
1970s (cf. the superb analysis in Mortensen & Møller 1976, esp. 9–35).
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well-defined place for the state in his conceptual scheme, he does not dismiss the formal political
system per se as irrelevant. It is irrelevant as far people’s everyday media reception or political
talk is concerned, because ‘new politics’ is not instrumental but expressive, or it is not interested
in  problems of  distribution  but  in  the  struggle  for  recognition.  The  communicative  aspect  of  the
radical democracy of civic republicanism means that the core issue of extra-parliamentary politics
resides in maximising the possibilities various disenfranchised groups have in bringing to public
attention their viewpoints. Increasing democracy is increasing communicative transparency in this
respect. Although this sounds proto-Habermasian, Dahlgren’s final step, betraying his connection
to Cultural Studies, distances him from limiting discussion to deliberation.
(3) Because the foundations of civic culture, for Dahlgren, are to be found in everyday
life and its routines – that is, common sense – the forms of communication it requires must also be
down to earth, or popular. The chain of presuppositions and implications in Dahlgren’s
argumentation would then look something like the following: in order to operate untarnished,
democracy needs an adequate civic culture, which needs citizens communicating with each other
in the popular mode. I will say a few words about how this excludes a strictly deliberative view of
democracy, and how it accords a central place to popular public culture.
Deliberative democracy as generally understood (cf. also Bessette 1994) and
Dahlgren’s civic republicanism have in common the basic assumption that democracy is a form of
government that seeks for the public good by means of discussion and reasoning. Dahlgren’s
conception differs from that of deliberative democracy in two central respects: he does not connect
discussion to political decision-making, and he allows a much wider repertoire of discursive
modes for democratically relevant talk. The first difference, which I will take up later, seems to be
a logical consequence of his antistatism as defined above, while the second one is associated with
his Counter-Enlightenment or postmodern inclinations. The a- and irrational undercurrents of
communication, as explored by psychoanalysis and psychoanalytically inspired semiotics (like
that of Julia Kristeva), are given a sympathetic treatment in Television and the Public Sphere.
Even if Dahlgren, like Habermas during the 1970s, seems to have lost interest in psychoanalysis
when going forward, the dichotomy between cognitive and affective (but mostly missing the third
link  in  Kant’s  trio:  volitive)  has   remained  central  to  his  thesis.  It  is  the  “rationalist  bias”
(Dahlgren 2005b, 156) of Habermas that has to be avoided, or complemented with an adequate
consideration of those aspects of communication which carry meaning between the lines. But as
deliberation in the procedural sense inevitably means making analytical distinctions on the basis
of varying evidence and value commitments, the rational discourse must take precedence over the
arational one. This is something, however, which Cultural Studies has long denied.
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In fact, Dalgren’s distinction between the rational and arational has one of its
conceptual predecessors in John Fiske’s and John Hartley’s Reading Television (1978, 117–121),
where it takes the opposition, drawn from Basil Bernstein’s sociolinguistics, between the elaborate
code of middle-class talk and and the restricted code of working-class talk. Introducing the
popular mode into the inceptive Cultural Studies, Fiske and Hartley take up the lead and adopt the
distinction to analysing television as a form of proletarian public sphere. Later on, when Cultural
Studies dropped the class perspective, what was formerly considered as proletarian became hailed
as the popular as such (see, e.g., Fiske 1987). It is no wonder that also Dahlgren (1995) uses
television as exhibit one to prove that there is something fatally wrong with the alleged
Habermasian, rationalist or formalist manner of conceptualising communication. Still, in
defending popular media forms, Dahlgren, once again, is wary of not conceding too much to the
populist drive of Cultural Studies. This balancing emphasis may even explain the striking shift of
his interest,  visible in the 2000s, from television to the internet.
Dahlgren had already during the 1980s defended an approach to television
underscoring the non-informational aspects of the medium which require a more hermeneutic way
of inquiry (see, e.g., Dahlgren 1985) – a line of research culminating in Television and the Public
Sphere, his best-known work. In late modern conditions, it is television that the most closely
approximates with the general symbolic environment, or the cultural resources at the disposal of
everyday actors. This is why “democratic politics must inevitably walk at least in part with popular
culture” (Dahlgren 2005a, 322), wherever it may lead us. Dahlgren’s main interest in the internet
does not, however, focus on the use of the net for infotainment, but for direct political engagement.
The reason for this might be that the development of television, especially television journalism, in
spite of the promising enlargement of its discursive means via popularisation, did not turn out to be
what Dahlgren expected in the mid to late 1990s. Namely, in a couple of pieces towards the end of
the millennium (Dahlgren 1998; 1999), he defended public-service television and urged European
broadcasting companies to lend their ears to more innovative attempts at developing serious
(popular) television journalism. On this interpretation, what ensued from the popular promise of
television was not at the level of the political promises at the new historical juncture of liberal
democracy. Popular democracy had to focus, instead of the semiotic democracy of television (Fiske
1987, 236–239), on the prospects of dialogical democary in the web.
A Critique of Dahlgren
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Peter Dahlgren’s attemp to synthetise Critical Theory of Habermasian inflection with second-wave
Cultural Studies is well-grounded, in both respects. Even if early Habermas, contrary to prevailing
misunderstandings in contemporary English-language media studies, was well aware of the need for
a comprehensive concept of public sphere covering its both political and cultural dimensions, he has
never returned to this original intuition in any rigorous manner, only repeating ideas of the early
1960s (cf., especially, Habermas 1992, 399–467; 2008a). Given Habermas’s post-Marxist theory of
society, based on the duality between system and life-world as defined against communicative
rationality, and his more recent theory of deliberative democracy, articulating the ideal
communicative conditions that should obtain between system and life-world in a radically
democratic polity, one may legitimately aspire for a more balanced relation between the political
and cultural public spheres.9 To propose post-1970s Cultural Studies for this mediating role in
media research goes by itself, especially if one shares Habermas’s phenomenological emphasis on
the actor’s perspective. The task is then to show how the results of the new reception studies may
shed light on, if not make inevitable, a conception of politics grounded on everyday acitivies like
television  watching.  But  the  problem  with  the  new  Cultural  Studies  is  that,  by  celebrating  the
emancipatory potential of popular culture, it tends to totally conflate the political and cultural public
spheres – i.e., turn politics into cultural politics revolving around the issue of media representations
(cf., e.g., McKee 2005). Political engagement needs, however, also other sources of information
than commercial media output, and other forms of civic participation than consuming mediated
messages.
Dahlgren’s highly welcome project of trying to overcome imperfections underlying
both Habermasian Critical Theory and ‘postmodern’ Cultural Studies is considerably weakened by
a host of conceptual, theoretical and empirical factors. I will organise them around the three aspects
with which I analysed his general framework: (1) the problem of civic culture, media culture
included, and its relation to political action; (2) the radicality of Dahlgren’s civic republicanism;
and (3) the question of participation (talking) versus observation (reading, watching) in the
communicative definition of the ideal democracy.
(1)  The  idea  of  political  culture  based  on  the  education  of  civic  virtues  played  a
prominent  role  in  Aristotle’s  conception  of  the  stability  of  state  forms  in Politics, and it has been
part  of  Western  political  thought  ever  since  (for  a  succint  overview,  see  Almond  1989).  It  is,
however, the postwar inquiry into civic cultures, inaugurated by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney
Verba (1965), that gave rise to a still lively research tradition (as a good introduction, see Pickel &
9 This is accomplished by Jeffrey Alexander’s new ambitious theory of civil society, which, from the angle adopted
here, could be seen as an updated version of Strukturwandel (see Alexander 2006, 69–105).
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Pickel 2006, 15–147). In order to fill the gap in both Habermasian Critical Theory and receptionist
Cultural Studies, Dahlgren introduces civic-culture studies as a corrective. However, Dahlgren
dismisses summarily the relevance of the tradition represented by Almond and Verba, accusing it of
reductionism, ethnocentrism and psychologism (Dahlgren 2000a, 336; Dahlgren 2002, 19), which
involves  the  risk  of  forcing  himself  to  reinvent  the  wheel.  In  other  words,  there  are  many
similarities between Dahlgren and the ‘traditional’ civic-culture studies that could have been of
assistance to Dahlgren. I will briefly indicate how.
Almond and Verba’s (1965) seminal work, like many of the studies within the
tradition (Dahlgren’s output makes no exception), was oriented by a sense of endangered
democracy. The empirical data of the study were gathered amidst the Cold War in the late 1950s,
when the political consolidation of formerly fascist West Germany and Italy was still incomplete,
and the instability of France, culminating in the establishment of the Fifth Republic, was obvious.10
Almond and Verba’s not so implicit aim, hardly covered by the detachment empirical surveys tend
to  impose  on  the  results,  was  to  show  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  and  especially  the  United
States, was the paradigm of democratic stability. The reason for this brings me to the conceptual
solution I think Dahlgren should have considered more carefully.
Almond and Verba define the civic culture typical of stable democracies as a mix of
three ideal types of political culture: parochial (in which citizens give no allegiance towards the
political system); subject (in which citizens accept the polity but are subservient); and participant
(in which citizens are active in their civic roles). Civic culture is a combination of parochial, subject
and  participant  political  cultures  in  that  it  allows  the  ideal  citizen  to  possess  the  seemingly
contradictory characteristics of passivity and activity: in his or her role as a citizen, one may –
depending on the context – behave politically in an indifferent, submissive or opposing way,
respectively. The most heuristic aspect of the definition here makes it clear why one of Dahlgren’s
basic premises, that apparently passive people can in fact, given proper circumstances (e.g.,
Dahlgren 2000a, 311–312), show considerable interest in political engagement, is not an anomaly
but the standard case in healthy democracies as defined by Almond and Verba.
The tradition of civic-culture studies, in and beyond Almond and Verba, casts light on
the status of two further questions at the heart of Dahlgren’s conception: the expressive nature of
new politics, and the explanatory force of the civic-culture paradigm. Of all the features that define
the civic culture according to Dahlgren identity is the most important, so that people act politically
10 In their comparative study, Aldmond and Verba juxtapose civic cultures with different political traditions:  Anglo-
American (Britain, USA), Continental European (West Germany, Italy) and other (Mexico). In Almond (1956), there is
a preliminary justification for this kind of classification.
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on the basis of their self-definitions. Politics becomes then a form of giving expression to one’s self,
best exemplified for Dahlgren by new social movements. But there is the conceptual and empirical
problem of how much political weight the expressive dimension of identity is able to carry. Almond
and Verba thought that, for democracy to work, there must be a balance between the citizen’s
expressive and instrumental orientations, which was part of their philosophical indebtedness to
Talcott Parsons or, more fundamentally, to Enlightenment humanism. One might say that the
exclusive stress on political self-expression risks over-dramatising politics (it is concerned only
with things having existential importance), while conversely relying only on instrumental
considerations risks under-dramatising politics (it has to do only with the means but never with the
goals). Having it both ways may even clarify why the crisis of democracy, which Dahlgren accepts
as a fact, may be seen in a different light. Namely, if we make a disctinction between the
expressive, moral and instrumental levels of allegiance to the democratic polity, of which the first is
concerned with the identification with democratic ideals in general, the second with the legitimacy
of  democracy  as  a  political  system,  and  the  third  with  the  satisfaction  citizens  feel  as  to  the
performance of a specific democratic state, a democracy may be in crisis at the third, but not at the
other levels (cf. Pickel & Pickel 2006, 85–100).
The civic-culture approach emerged as a reaction against institutional and structural
explanations of political bahaviour, which required better ways of classifying existing political
systems (Almond 1956). One could not remain at the level of laws and ethical norms, because
formally similar political systems performed differently. Hence, the intermediary or mesolevel of
the civic culture was introduced between the macrolevel of political instutitions and the micro-level
of actors (Pickel & Pickel 2006, 49–58). In this way individuals’ political behaviour in different
democratic countries could be explained as mediated by the content of the corresponding civic
cultures. One of the standard objections raised to the civic-culture approach has been that it is
illegitimate to conclude from the existence of culture as attitudes, norms and competences to
manifest action (Pickel & Pickel 2006, 31–36). It is just this extrapolation that Dahlgren uses as his
starting-point for arguing in favour of the civic-culture paradigm in the study of political
communication.  It  is  true  that  he  backs  his  thesis  up  with  empirical  case  studies  and  theoretical
pondering, but he fails to demonstrate that civic culture is to be privileged to the institutional level
as the main factor explaining the support Western democratic regimes – judged from the few
references to singular democracies he makes, Dahlgren seems to have in mind especially the United
States – still draw from their citizens. This issue can be approached indirectly by considering the
meaning of mass media for political engagement; that is, if media are relevant for sustaining the
civic culture, they must be contribute to the mobilising of private persons to public participation.
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The picture one can draw from empirical research is, however, ambivalent (as a comprehensive
overview of German- and English-language studies of political communication, see Schulz 2008).
On the basis of empirical evidence, but presumably also because it flattered their
national pride, Almond and Verba came to the conclusion that what contributed most to the stability
of democracy was a civic culture compatible with a balanced modern – and middle-class – social
life best exemplified in their survey by the USA. Almond and Verba did not, surprisingly, consider
mass media as primary factors in the formation of civic culture, contrary to the disciplinary
consensus in mass communication research. It was rather the connection between the family,
voluntary associations and the work-place which, by developing civil courage, mutual trust and
cooperative skills, nurtured the grassroots of political participation. In the study of political
communication, Dahlgren included, it goes by itself that in contemporary Western democracies the
mass media are a prime, if not the prime agent of political life at the formal level, but also at that of
civil society. The media are the chief source of political information for people who, in the same
way, learn how they should behave as citizens. As self-evident as this may sound as a description of
late modern political socialisation, there exist factors that complicate the picture. Almond and
Verba (1965, 136–167) already pointed out the discrepancy between the amount of political
information and political participation: the motivation to act politically is sustained by other factors
than those linked to the fact of being well-informed. The empirical evidence on how the media
contribute to increasing or decreasing people’s interest in politics seems to be, significantly, non-
conclusive.
Schulz’s (2008, 155–227) review refers to two trends the relevance of which is
theoretically hard to combine in terms of media influence. On one hand, as also suggested by
political sociology of the 20th century (Mann 1995), there has occurred depolitisation of the young,
who from the early 20th century radicalism to the upsurge of the ‘1968ers’ belonged to the political
avant-garde on the right and left. On the other, the interest in politics has increased, as new spheres
of life have assumed political significance and as new media have emerged to facilitate political
expression as well as group-formation. But if citizens’ political participation is connected to their
political interests, and if civic culture is the ground which affects both, one may legitimately ask
whether  the  main  burden  of  proof  falls  on  media  or  other  influences  in  explaining  crisis  of
democracy. Comparing the three ‘crisis periods’ of the 20th century – the interwar decades, the
turbulent years in the 1960s to 1970s, and the end of the millennium – in terms of political
communication and its relation to political behaviour, extremist and conventional, might help shed
some light on the explanatory dilemma (material for such a historical-comparative approach is
provided by Bertho Lavenir 2000).
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(2) Democracy is an exceptional form of government as testified by the fact that it was
only after the 20th century antifascist and anticolonial struggles combined with the collapse of the
state-socialist rule in Europe, that it achieved its present quasi-self-evident status. Yet, also the
Soviet Union and other countries dominated by the communist parties considered themselves as
socialist republics or people’s democracies – that is, as radical democracies. The idea of radical
democracy, supported by Dahlgren and other media activists leaning to the left, needs obviously
some  clarification.  To  gain  more  insight  into  the  specificity  as  well  as  problems  of  Dahlgren’s
conception of civic republicanism, it is helpful to start once again from Habermas’s (1962) original
version of the public-sphere theory.
Habermas’s conception of the bourgeois or liberal public sphere is based on a dialectic
between differentiation and integration, which defines the bourgeois or liberal society as such. First,
the new form of public sphere, based on autonomous individuals in their triple capacities (as human
beings, as bourgeois private persons, and as citizens), becomes possible when the political society
of the state is differentiated from the non-political one (called simply ‘society’). The non-political
society of private relations, standing on the ground of the family (consisting of the intimate sphere)
and of civil society (defined by contractual relations on the basis of private property), serves as the
guarantor of individual self-determination, communicative competences included. It is only with the
help of this social infrastructure that people can assume their role as citizens. But this, second, calls
for an integrative mechanism in the form of public communication, or communication among
private persons gathered as a public. In this way the public sphere, previously without any links to
popular engagement, becomes the major means by which people outside of the state machine can
not  only  express  their  sentiments  and  opinions,  but  ideally  also  control  and  direct  the  course  of
public policy.  In sum, the bourgeois society is  based on political  (state) and non-political  (family,
civil society) spheres, and these are mediated by the sphere of the public, which is in itself both
political and non-political (cultural), otherwise it could not be a mediator.
The next step of the dialectic in Habermas’s analysis, the decline of the bourgeois
model of differentiation and integration, or the structural transformation of the public sphere, paves
way for the introduction of Habermas’s early version of radical or late bourgeois democracy. It  is
predicated on two premises which bring us closer to contemporary debates. First, as the
diffentiation of state and society, in the conditions of social (Sozialstaat) or welfare state, dissolves,
social issues assume political character and public policy intervenes in private matters. That is, in a
postmodern way of speaking, a general blurring of distinctions follows, which means considerable
expansion of the range of potentially political issues. Second, as a result of the dedifferentiation
described, the bourgeois public, the carrier of the liberal public sphere, becomes disintegrated. Its
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place is taken by the social agents capable of integrating the welfare state, the publics formed within
social organisations and having their rights guaranteed by the new constitutional statutes of the
social state, as the rights of the bourgeois public sphere had been guaranteed by the documents of
the great bourgeois revolutions (such as the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, even if, for
lack of comparability with European developments, the young Habermas excludes the case of the
United States from his historical panorama).
On this reading, radical democracy implies two kinds of critique of the liberal model
of representative government. First, private concerns should be more easily transformed, via the
mass media, into public issues, and, second, civil-society actors should have a greater say in
influencing formal policy. These are just the phenomena also Dahlgren thinks explain the rise of so-
called new politics: life-style or identity problems generating new social movements. The question
is  how  both  radical  and  feasible  Dahlgren’s  civic  republicanism  really  is.  I  will  assess  this  by
commenting his relation to Mouffe and by comparing his model with the latest formulation of
Habermas’s public-sphere theory.
Dahlgren’s explanation for the potential political meaning of social life is ontological
rather than institutional. To demonstrate that the blurring of social concerns and political issues
does not emergence as a consequence of the development of modern society, but resides in the very
core of the human condition, Dahlgren resorts to the political philosophy of Chantal Mouffe, taking
up her distinction between antagonistic and agonistic political relations (Dahlgren 2002, 12–13;
2007, 61–62). The distinction is based on a reading of Carl Schmitt, once Adolf Hitler’s advisor on
constitutional law, whose emergence as an intellectual authority on the radical left has caused some
controversy (see Monod 2006).11 Mouffe proposes that we counter liberal principles of politics,
bent on suppressing cleavages in people’s political orientations, with a Schmittian emphasis on
conflictuality as the basis of all politics (cf. Mouffe 1997; 1999; 2005). This gives rise to Mouffe’s
distinction between the political and politics, with the political (the ontological)  preceding any
singular instances of politics (the ontic). Liberal democracy of the radical sort becomes possible for
Mouffe, and for Dahlgren, when it is further assumed that the partners in any conflict treat each
others as adversaries, not as enemies. It is by this way that the Schmittian antagonism, the model of
which  seems  to  be  Hegel’s  view  of  states  as  inherently  belligerent  in  their  mutual  relations  (cf.
Schmitt 1930), can be mediated with liberal civility defined as agonistic pluralism. One wonders
whether this amounts to anything else but the “limited polarisation” (Parsons) also proto-liberals
11 As a matter of fact, it is well-known that Schmitt was also one of early Habermas’s sources of inspiration in his
critique of the postwar parliamentarism in the Federal Republic (see for details, e.g., Jäger 1973); Habermas himself
(2009, 12–15) admits as much.
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can whole-heartedly ascribe to (cf. Almond & Verba 1965, 358). Anyway, the focus here is on the
specificity of Dahlgren’s civic republicanism in terms of radical democracy and public sphere.
Radical liberal democracy, which excludes the democratisation of the economy, starts
from two conditions made possible by late modernity: the extension of politics to cover previously
non-political issues, and the increasing pressure the civil society is supposed to exert on the state.
Because of his concept of politics, Dahlgren is mainly interested in elaborating consequences of the
former phenomenon, while Habermas’s (2008a)12 idea of deliberative democracy is analysis of the
mechanisms  of  the  latter  option.  This  is  also  a  way  of  sorting  out  limits  of  Dahlgren’s  position,
which  I  will  attempt  by  a  three-step  comparison  between  his  and  Habermas’s  model  of  political
communication.
The basic problem of democracy, to which conservatives, liberals and radicals have a
different answer, resides in the contradictory requirements it should meet (cf. Preuss 1989). On one
hand, democracy is supposed to mean popular sovereignty, the rule of the people, but, on the other,
it  should  result  in  policies  speaking  out  the  best  interests  of  the  people  –  i.e.,  be  rational  or
acceptable in the long run. That there can be a contradiction between these purposes is evident.
Decisions made on the basis of the most active participation of the citizenry can lead to disastrous
consequences, which means that they have been unwise and uncorrelated with the long-standing
interests of the people; and decisions indicating high quality of statecraft, and serving undoubtedly
well  the  general  welfare,  can  be  made  by  a  small  group  of  politicians,  or  maybe  just  by  one13.
Dahlgren  differs  from  Habermas  in  that  he,  like  most  of  the  Cultural  Studies  tradition,  pays  but
scant attention to the problem of rationality. Because politics is overwhelmingly an issue of finding
outlets for the expression of one’s identity, a good democracy is where every single group can
follow its own generally recognised standards while sticking to a minimum of mutual respect – at
whatever cost to the functioning of the society at large, both immediately and in the long run. From
this basic solution follow Dahlgren’s and Habermas’s different views on democratic
communication.
Dahlgren’s turn from television to the internet as the main focus of his scholarly
interests was accompanied by a shift of perspectives from an institutionally informed conception, to
be seen in Television and the Public Sphere, his most balanced work, to one concentrating on
everyday actors mainly. That is, in drawing attention to the significance everyday talk has for the
12 This is the considerably enlarged German-language version of the keynope speech, published in Communication
Theory,  Habermas gave at an ICA conference in Dresden in 2006. Because of its many additions, e.g., a note on the
nature of a possible Europe-wide public sphere, it can be considered as Habermas’s most comprehensive analysis of the
subject since Strukturwandel.
13 This is Schmitt’s rationale for defending dictatorship as a form of democracy.
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proper functioning of democracy, he is not interested in how this local talk among citizens might
have influence outside of a specific context (cf., e.g., Dahlgren 2002; 2006).  A healthy democracy,
for Dahlgren, consists of people conversing with each other on matters which could turn out to have
political implications, irrespective of whether they really have or not. For, to exert influence on the
society at large, everyday interpersonal communication has to be transformed into a voice to be
heard elsewhere, too. The medium of this, public opinion, was early Habermas’s main problem in
Strukturwandel –  the  title  of  the  Italian  translation  of  the  book  is Storia e critica dell’opinione
pubblica –   and  it  is  still  at  the  core  of  his  concept  of  the  public  sphere.  The  function  of  mass
communication, in Habermas’s view, is not only to make the communicatively limited talk of
everyday life be heard more widely, but also to compress it into considered (reflektierte) public
opinions, which approximate the will of the people at the life-world level. Habermas’s specific
word for this function is ‘filtering’: it is only by filtering, that is, sorting out opinions representing
universally acceptable interests from those giving expression to particular ones only, or making the
rational  outcome  of  everyday  talk  possible,  that  the  two  levels  of  civic  communication,
interpersonal and mass, can be combined in a late-modern complex society. By leaving the
connection  unspecified,  Dahlgren,  for  his  part,  fails  to  show  how  radical  democracy  could  work
effectively in the contemporary world. Comparing, finally, Habermas’s defence of old mass media
(cf.  also  Habermas  2008b)  and  Dahlgren’s  emphasis  on  the  new  ones  rounds  up  my  reservations
about Dahlgren’s model in this issue.
In order to show that the mass media like the newspaper can operate as a filtering
device Habermas has to speak for the aspects of mass communication those enthusing over so-
called interactive media consider as its fatal defects: namely, that mass communication is abstract
and asymmetrical. In other words, the way the old mass media operate is by abstracting from the
kind of interpresonal closeness peculiar to interpresonal communication, and by keeping the contact
flowing into one direction only, from the speaker to the listener – and, as far as democracy in a
complex society is concerned, there is in principle nothing problematic about this arrangement. In
his latest statement on the public sphere, preceded and anticipated by what he said in the early
1990s (Habermas 1992, 435–467), Habermas explicitly distances his idea of public communication
from the model of face-to-face interaction, an accusation his earlier version has aroused in many
quarters. It is exactly because mass communication and interpresonal communication are not
conflated, that the former can bring some coherence to the immense amount of talk and
communicative interaction at the level of everyday life – that is, serve as a social space for
formulating publicly relevant opinions. Whether mass media are capable of performing this
function in practice, is an empirical question, depending, especially, on the amount of power over
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which differently positioned social actors can wield in their relations with the media. It is the role of
critical media research, for Habermas, to observe whether the requirements of public opinion-
formation are properly met.
As far as the political public sphere is concerned, Habermas (2008a, 161–163) does
not consider the web as a substitute for the quality media of the old type; but Dahlgren does, though
with  some  reservations.  This  seems  to  be  logical,  given  Dahlgren’s  main  interests.  Namely,  as
Dahlgren equates democracy with its  possibility at  the level of the civic culture centering on self-
images, values and competences, he focuses on the internet as a resource of political engagement, as
in  the  case  of  the  young (Dahlgren  & Olsson  2007).  It  is,  however,  one  thing  to  demonstrate  that
citizens can find the web helpful for gathering information or making contact with like-minded
partners, and another to show that it can operate as an abstracting and generalising medium capable
of filtering considered public opinions out of the infinite mass of messages not only in the new
media (websites, blogs, and the like) but also in the old ones. But unless there are at the disposal of
the political decision-making process media of the latter sort, there is no way, outside of the formal
election process, of arriving at what the people want and whether their wants accord with the public
good. The upshot seems to be a legacy handed down to Dahlgren by the second-wave Cultural
Studies, with is celebration of subcultures and dismissal of formal politics as elitist. The impression
is strengthened by the fact that, even if Dahlgren does now and then cursorily allude to the
importance of legislative bodies and the executive branch (Dahlgren 2000a, 335; 2001b, 40; 2003,
164; 2005a, 325), his conduct of political-communication research is oriented towards the extra-
parliamentary context only. More specifically, of the four possible types of political communication
sorted out by Schudson (1989, 152), Dahlgren focuses almost exclusively on one, on the way the
governed communicate among themselves.
(3) What if democracy does not “reside, ultimately, with citizens who engage in talk
with each other” (Dahlgren 2005b), or if democracy resides in communication, though not primarily
in speaking but in listening? The controversy between Lippmann and Dewey in the 1920s, now
universally considered as a paradigmatic case in the field, hinged on this issue, even if Dewey’s
standpoint was not as opposite to that of Lippmann as is generally accepted (for two interpretations,
see Malmberg 2009; Schudson 2008). Anyway, Lippmann (1925) defended the idea that, for
democracy to operate properly, the citizens as publics must assume the viewpoint of observers and
spectators, being outside of the political stage in a position to assess the performance of the political
actors. Dahlgren does not consider adequately this option, especially when he moves from
television to the internet. Habermas’s (2008a) framework, basically a variant of the same republican
ethos “with a predilection for continuous discourse” (Heller 1985, 24) that informs Dahlgren, is in
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this sense more comprehensive, reserving a not insignificant place for the listening subject. This has
to do with the idea of deliberative communication.
Dahlgren dismisses the deliberative idea of discussion as too rationalist and restrictive.
He is right in the description but not necessarily in the evaluation. In fact, there is a tension not
easily dissolved in Dahlgren’s argumentation. On the one hand, he correctly emphasises the
cognitive aspects of political communication such as news, not accepting the disregard for factual
objectivity popular in Cultural Studies circles. One cannot act responsibly without knowing what is
going on in the outer world. However, on the other hand, when dealing with everyday talk, the
nucleus of his idea of how citizenship is nurtured, Dahlgren remains silent about the cognitive
aspect, as if identities were just agglomerations of subject positions on this and that moral-emotive
issue. It is true that he has a place for knowledge as a source of civic culture and, hence, of political
engagement. But he does not consider the acquisition of knowledge, the art of reading, watching
and listening, at the same level as its use in talking. This, however, is the crux of Lippmann’s
conception, and it is included in the Habermasian model, too.
To have a realist theory of political life, an objective one can easily share with
Dahlgren (see, e.g., Dahlgren 1996, 61; 2001b, 48), the talkative aspect of citizenship has to be
combined with the spectatorial one, without apriorically privileging the one to the other. This is the
beaty of soft versions of deliberative democracy, giving leeway for moving from communicative
interaction with others to that with texts (cf. Bessette 1994, 49). It seems that Dahlgren, putting too
much theoretical weight on the specificity of the internet, ignores the dialectic of two functions of
communication: to open ourselves, via speech, to others, and to disclose the world, via cultural
texts, to ourselves. The latter moment of the dialectic may include cognitive, moral and aesthetic
aspects. It is in accordance with the Enlightenment tradition to see political education, or the
formation of the collective polity as well as of the individual political subject, to be embedded in
cognitive, moral and aesthetic relations with the social and natural world. This is why the cultural
public sphere, with an emphasis on the spectatorial moment of the dialectic, figured so prominently
in Habermas’s theory before the stress on deliberation. The young Habermas did not, however,
follow those in the earlier Frankfurt School like Herbert Marcuse, who stuck to the model of
Schiller’s aesthetic education, conceptualising politics in an aesthetic language; in Schiller’s
memorable words, “it is through beaty that one enters the realm of freedom”.  Rather, Habermas
subordinated the aestetic to the political,  and the political  to the communicative,  ending up with a
model which, as was to be expected, has aroused criticism both of insensitivity to the affective
undercurrents of politics and of reducing politics to consensus-seeking by discourse. Dahlgren
accepts both of these lines of critique, using Cultural Studies and Mouffe as his strongest counter-
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arguments. Unfortunately, he has missed the other side of the Englightenment dialectic, the
receptive citizen whose autonomy grows when he fills himself with the elements of truth, moral
integrity and beaty the social and natural worlds put at his disposal.
Conclusion: For a ‘Dialectical Turn’ in Critical Mass Communication Research
One could argue, like Klaus Bruhn Jensen (1995, 58), that Habermas Strukturwandel “remains the
best framework for a comprehensive analysis of culture and communication in modern Western
societies” – provided we keep to the general framework of the work rather than to all the specific
solutions involved. One could also argue that Cultural Studies is an approach commanding
attention, not only because of its impressive academic success story, but also because of its
continuities with critical traditions in mass communication studies. Narrowing the gap between
Critical  Studies,  Habermasian  but  also  other,  and  Cultural  Studies,  old  or  new,  seems  then  to  be
well-grounded.  It  is  a  credit  to  Peter  Dahlgren  that  he  has  provided  us  with  an  example  how this
ecumenic interest could be served between mutually hostile critical camps. That he has not lived up
to all reasonable expectations may be less important than the effort to survey unexplored terrain and
map out courses for others to pursue in greater detail. As a conclusion, I would like speculate, on
the basis of Habermas and Critical Theory, about the theoretical and methodological principles
needed in keeping this project going.
One of the standard misunderstandings about Critical Theory, emerging repeatedly
when empiricist notions of research occupy the centre stage, concerns the speculative nature of its
generalisations and the substitution of the normative for the empirical. Not that these accusations
are void of truth-content, but they mostly miss the point or are not as compelling as they are thought
to be. Take the practice, widely shared by those doing qualitative audience research within the
Cultural Studies, of dismissing Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s theory of the culture industry because it
has  no  place  for  active  receivers.  It  may  be  so,  but  it  is  also  that  Horkheimer  and  Adorno’s
conception is a theory of antiliberal capitalism as a social system, of which the cultural-industrial
subsystem forms a part. It might be better to start the critique, not with the phenomenological level
of individual communicative actors, but with the non-phenomenological level of the systemic
characteristics forced on the culture industry, mass media included, by the advance of commodity
production in the 20th (for the distinction between the levels, see, e.g., Schanz 1977). It may be that
the critique would end up with the same negative conclusion; but it would, nevertheless, take
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seriously the problem Horkheimer and Adorno are addressing, and not replace it by the one more
convenient to the critics.
The problem Habermas set himself at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, especially with
Strukturwandel, was how to conceive of a modern conception of critical social science that could
perform the same function the classic discourse of politics had done from antiquity to early
modernity. What was needed was a comprehensive and multidisciplinary perspective the general
principles of which had been elaborated by the first generation of Critical Theory. In studying
public communication, exemplified by the nature and evolution of the bourgeois public sphere, this
called for, according to Habermas, a combination of disciplines like:  political philosophy, political
sociology (both comparative and historical), capitalism theory, social history (of the family,
especially), literary history and theory of the novel, history and theory of mass communication
(adopting, but also going beyond, Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment), public-
opinion  research  –  and,  last  but  not  least,  the  grand  vision  of  the  modern  society  as  a  unity  in
difference, based on a Marxist reading of Kant and Hegel. That many a voice in the media studies,
immersed in empiricist presumptions of what qualifies as good scholarship, has found this
perplexing, is understandable. After the 1970s, Habermas’s example has not been followed as often
as the intellectual rigour of his early methodology would have made one expect. What is more,
Habermas himself dropped the study of public sphere for some 30 years, to return to the theme
sporadically at the turn of the 1990s (Habermas 1989; 1990; 1992,  435–467). Now the aim was less
to develop, in the spirit of the early Frankfurt School,  a sociologically and historically informed as
well as a comprehensive methodology than to reduce it, in inquiring into deliberative democracy, to
the basic issue of how to connect normative and empirical research to each other.
Early on, Cultural Studies oriented towards a reversal of the Habermasian problematic
by denying the emancipatory potential of middle-class codes of serious and not so serious
communication in the fields of everyday interaction as well as of art and entertainment. It was
argued, from the late 1970s on14, that such principles of speaking to each other were a hindrance to
real social liberation, which called for the emancipation of communicative modes, especially those
used in everyday informal contexts and in the tradition of music halls. In consequence, mainstream
Cultural Studies scholars have whole-heartedly endorsed the tabloidisation of media, audiovisual
and print (from Fiske 1992 to McKee 2005). All this has had an enormous impact on the kind of
human science that is called for in exploring the new media-landscape. The dialectical project of
Hall, inspired by the methodological introduction in Marx’s Grundrisse, explicated in the mid-
14 Raymond Williams saw the singular uniqueness of the working-class, best characterising its sort of popular culture, in
the organisations it had produced, not primarily in its modes of plebeijan discourse.
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1970s and used as a basis for his best-known piece on encoding and decoding, of which
characteristically only the notion of active reception stayed alive in the post-1970s Cultural Studies,
was substituted for the analytical project paying attention to only one only moment, especially that
of reception, at a time.15 What ensued was the revival of the ethnographic approach, an old British
specialty, and the study of small and minority collectives, such as fans and lesbians, harking back to
earlier community and subcultural studies known from American sosiology.
Peter Dahlgren’s project can be seen against this background, reminding those in the
Culture Studies camp of the greater picture and relevant methodologies they are in the risk of
suppressing (quite explicitly stated in Dahlgren 1997, 58–60), and those in Critical Theory
following Habermas of the need of untying connections to Enlightenment criteria of rationality and
communicative competence. The introduction of a focus on civic culture as an explanatory level
may be seen to satisfy both aims, even insufficiently. On the one hand, while the approach, with is
emphasis on culture as an independent variable and with its empirical thrust, opens later Cultural
Studies up to take issue with the political public domain, not only the cultural one. On the other
hand, underscoring the embeddedness of political engagement in civic culture, a theme close to
Habermas, even if never explicated extensively (Habermas 1973 is the most important source,
taking up, among others, the Almond and Verba classic), may increase dialogue in political-
communication studies between various republican critiques of neo-liberalist tendencies. What is
missing, though, in his œuvre, as I have tried to argue in some detail, should make Dahlgren still
more sensitive to the sense of multivalent critical methodology so memorably captured by
Habermas, especially in his classic on the public sphere.
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